<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	
	xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss"
	xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Politics and Policy &#8211; To Archeio</title>
	<atom:link href="https://toarcheio.org/publishers/politics-and-policy/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://toarcheio.org</link>
	<description>To Archeio project site</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2020 14:27:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-GB</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>Radical Pension Reforms after the Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina and Greece</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/radical-pension-reforms-after-the-crisis-a-comparative-analysis-of-argentina-and-greece/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/radical-pension-reforms-after-the-crisis-a-comparative-analysis-of-argentina-and-greece/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Scholarly attention on pension reform following the recent global financial crisis has focused primarily on cases entailing the renationalization of private pension pillars. We argue that radical pension reforms should also include instances of radical retrenchment of public pension pillars. We offer an explanation of such reforms in the aftermath of the crisis by analyzing &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/radical-pension-reforms-after-the-crisis-a-comparative-analysis-of-argentina-and-greece/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scholarly attention on pension reform following the recent global financial crisis has focused primarily on cases entailing the renationalization of private pension pillars. We argue that radical pension reforms should also include instances of radical retrenchment of public pension pillars. We offer an explanation of such reforms in the aftermath of the crisis by analyzing the reforms adopted in Argentina and Greece since 2008. We demonstrate that highly indebted countries with no access to international financial markets and unsustainable pension systems can introduce radical reforms in response to short‐term funding needs rather than long‐term adequacy concerns. We argue that the narrow timeframe of the recent reforms raises questions about the sound footing of the new systems which may ultimately not prevent the introduction of further measures. This comparison provides insights to understand recent episodes of radical pension reforms in other countries.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Quid pro Quo: Political trust and policy implementation in Greece during the age of austerity</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government&#8217;s implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government&#8217;s implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms between 2010 and 2012 in two areas: tax and duty collection and liberalization of taxi licenses. Lower levels of trust decrease administrative capacity and widen problem intractability, creating a vicious cycle of noncooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications for administrative reforms and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
