https://toarcheio.org To Archeio project site Thu, 30 Apr 2020 14:16:36 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.1 https://toarcheio.org/items/lessons-from-the-greek-crisis/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:45 +0000 http://arc.local/items/lessons-from-the-greek-crisis/ Continued]]> There are two features of the Greek crisis that need explanation: the lopsided outcome where Greece did not achieve any of its stated goals; and the protracted negotiations. I explain these two features as results of two factors: Nested Games (the Greek prime minister was also involved in a game inside his own party); and incomplete information (the Greek government did not understand the weight of unanimity to change the status quo in the EU, and did the best it could to create a unanimity, of all the other countries, against it). The lessons from the crisis are two-sided: for the Greek side not to lose any more time in the application of the agreements (say, with elections); for the EU side to consider different ways of forming and aggregating preferences: having elections (with a wide EU constituency as opposed to national ones), and making decisions (eliminating the unanimity requirement).

]]> https://toarcheio.org/items/clientelism-and-economic-policy-hybrid-characteristics-of-collective-action-in-greece/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:44 +0000 http://arc.local/items/clientelism-and-economic-policy-hybrid-characteristics-of-collective-action-in-greece/ Continued]]> How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron–client relations and the context of collective action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation in policy-making processes.

]]> https://toarcheio.org/items/how-party-linkages-shape-austerity-politics-clientelism-and-fiscal-adjustment-in-greece-and-portugal-during-the-eurozone-crisis/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:31 +0000 http://arc.local/items/how-party-linkages-shape-austerity-politics-clientelism-and-fiscal-adjustment-in-greece-and-portugal-during-the-eurozone-crisis/ Continued]]> Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties.

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