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	<title>Zahariadis, N. &#8211; To Archeio</title>
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		<title>Policies that Succeed and Programs that Fail: Ambiguity, Conflict, and Crisis in Greek Higher Education</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/policies-that-succeed-and-programs-that-fail-ambiguity-conflict-and-crisis-in-greek-higher-education/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/policies-that-succeed-and-programs-that-fail-ambiguity-conflict-and-crisis-in-greek-higher-education/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why do some policies adopted by a wide margin fail to be implemented? Highlighting the role of policy entrepreneurial strategies within the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), we examine the implementation of Greek higher education reform in 2011 to argue that when policies adversely affect the status quo, successful entrepreneurial strategies of issue‐linkage and framing, side &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/policies-that-succeed-and-programs-that-fail-ambiguity-conflict-and-crisis-in-greek-higher-education/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why do some policies adopted by a wide margin fail to be implemented? Highlighting the role of policy entrepreneurial strategies within the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), we examine the implementation of Greek higher education reform in 2011 to argue that when policies adversely affect the status quo, successful entrepreneurial strategies of issue‐linkage and framing, side payments, and institutional rule manipulation are more likely to lead to implementation failure under conditions of crisis, centralized monopoly, and inconsistent political communication. The findings clarify MSA by specifying the conditions that increase the coupling strategies’ chances of success or failure and illuminate the role ambiguity and conflict play in policy reform and implementation.</p>
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		<title>Quid pro Quo: Political trust and policy implementation in Greece during the age of austerity</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government&#8217;s implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government&#8217;s implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms between 2010 and 2012 in two areas: tax and duty collection and liberalization of taxi licenses. Lower levels of trust decrease administrative capacity and widen problem intractability, creating a vicious cycle of noncooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications for administrative reforms and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice.</p>
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		<title>Policy Implementation and Political Trust: Greece in the Age of Austerity</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/policy-implementation-and-political-trust-greece-in-the-age-of-austerity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/policy-implementation-and-political-trust-greece-in-the-age-of-austerity/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why did the Greek Socialist government consistently fail to faithfully implement the bailout reforms between 2010 and 2011 despite strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framwork by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue political trust underpins the government&#8217;s implementation track record. We use a simple game of insecure contracts to find lower &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/policy-implementation-and-political-trust-greece-in-the-age-of-austerity/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why did the Greek Socialist government consistently fail to faithfully implement the bailout reforms between 2010 and 2011 despite strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framwork by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue political trust underpins the government&#8217;s implementation track record. We use a simple game of insecure contracts to find lower levels of trust can exacerbate macroeconomic conditions creating a vicious cycle of non-cooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications on administrative efforts to tackle the sovereign debt problem and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice. Implementation failure and responsibility drift may be explained by the (in)ability to generate long-term political trust in repeated iterations among implementation partners.</p>
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		<title>Greece&#8217;s debt crisis: A national tragedy of European proportions</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/greeces-debt-crisis-a-national-tragedy-of-european-proportions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/greeces-debt-crisis-a-national-tragedy-of-european-proportions/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Contrary to the view of most analysts, Nikolaos Zahariadis argues that Greece&#8217;s debt crisis is a European Union shortcoming with national and global dimensions. This does not mean that Greece&#8217;s profligate spending does not play a major role in this tragedy. Zahariadis states that, instead, viewing it simply as a Greek problem that needs to &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/greeces-debt-crisis-a-national-tragedy-of-european-proportions/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Contrary to the view of most analysts, Nikolaos Zahariadis argues that Greece&#8217;s debt crisis is a European Union shortcoming with national and global dimensions. This does not mean that Greece&#8217;s profligate spending does not play a major role in this tragedy. Zahariadis states that, instead, viewing it simply as a Greek problem that needs to be isolated and &#8220;corrected&#8221; will not solve a fundamental issue that underlies Europe&#8217;s predicament. There cannot be successful monetary integration without robust movement toward fiscal and perhaps political integration.</p>
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