<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	
	xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss"
	xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Stavrakakis, Y. &#8211; To Archeio</title>
	<atom:link href="https://toarcheio.org/people/stavrakakis-y/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://toarcheio.org</link>
	<description>To Archeio project site</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-GB</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>Debt Society: Psychosocial aspects of the (Greek) crisis</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/debt-society-psychosocial-aspects-of-the-greek-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/debt-society-psychosocial-aspects-of-the-greek-crisis/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[no abstract]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>no abstract</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dispatches from the Greek lab: Metaphors, strategies and debt in the European crisis</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/dispatches-from-the-greek-lab-metaphors-strategies-and-debt-in-the-european-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/dispatches-from-the-greek-lab-metaphors-strategies-and-debt-in-the-european-crisis/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This field note is a first attempt to reflect on the choreography of the European crisis from a psychosocial perspective. It focuses on the situation as it has been unfolding in one of the debtor countries of the South, namely Greece. After mapping a variety of metaphors, repertoires and strategies used to energise blame and &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/dispatches-from-the-greek-lab-metaphors-strategies-and-debt-in-the-european-crisis/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This field note is a first attempt to reflect on the choreography of the European crisis from a psychosocial perspective. It focuses on the situation as it has been unfolding in one of the debtor countries of the South, namely Greece. After mapping a variety of metaphors, repertoires and strategies used to energise blame and guilt and thus legitimise the neoliberal policies implemented, it elaborates on the multiple functions of debt, articulating a biopolitical approach with Freudian and Lacanian theorisations of the superego. It also inscribes within this framework the current mutations in political domination.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/left-wing-populism-in-the-european-periphery-the-case-of-syriza/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/left-wing-populism-in-the-european-periphery-the-case-of-syriza/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Due to its electoral performance in the 2012 general elections, SYRIZA, a previously unknown Greek political formation of the radical left, gained unprecedented visibility within the European public sphere. How is this strong showing and the political message articulated by SYRIZA to be interpreted? Utilizing a discursive methodology, this paper puts to the test the &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/left-wing-populism-in-the-european-periphery-the-case-of-syriza/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Due to its electoral performance in the 2012 general elections, SYRIZA, a previously unknown Greek political formation of the radical left, gained unprecedented visibility within the European public sphere. How is this strong showing and the political message articulated by SYRIZA to be interpreted? Utilizing a discursive methodology, this paper puts to the test the two assumptions predominating in most available analyses, namely that SYRIZA articulates a populist rhetoric, that it constitutes a predominantly populist force; and, given the near-exclusive association of populism with extreme right-wing movements, that SYRIZA constitutes a populist danger for Europe. Our analysis concludes that SYRIZA&#8217;s discourse is indeed a distinct articulation of left-wing populism. However, this by no means vindicates the second part of the prevailing wisdom: SYRIZA&#8217;s portrayal as a dangerous force threatening fundamental European values. If, however, this is the case, then mainstream research orientations in the study of European populism may have to be reviewed.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Return of “the People”: Populism and anti‐populism in the shadow of the European crisis</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/the-return-of-the-people-populism-and-anti%e2%80%90populism-in-the-shadow-of-the-european-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/the-return-of-the-people-populism-and-anti%e2%80%90populism-in-the-shadow-of-the-european-crisis/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[no abstract]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>no abstract</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A new populism index at work: identifying populist candidates and parties in the contemporary Greek context</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/a-new-populism-index-at-work-identifying-populist-candidates-and-parties-in-the-contemporary-greek-context/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/a-new-populism-index-at-work-identifying-populist-candidates-and-parties-in-the-contemporary-greek-context/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Interrogating available indexes from a discourse-theoretical point of view, this paper utilizes a reformulated populism index in order to identify populist parties. In particular, the index is applied in a candidate survey carried out in Greece in 2015. Findings indicate that this index allows for a clear differentiation between populist and non-populist parties. Based on &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/a-new-populism-index-at-work-identifying-populist-candidates-and-parties-in-the-contemporary-greek-context/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interrogating available indexes from a discourse-theoretical point of view, this paper utilizes a reformulated populism index in order to identify populist parties. In particular, the index is applied in a candidate survey carried out in Greece in 2015. Findings indicate that this index allows for a clear differentiation between populist and non-populist parties. Based on candidate attitudes, SYRIZA and ANEL belong to the first group whereas New Democracy, PASOK and River to the second. The examination of additional survey items reveals a clear ideological division within the populist camp: right-wing populism is exclusionary, while left-wing populism more inclusive and pluralist.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>European populist parties in government: How well are voters represented? Evidence from Greece</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/european-populist-parties-in-government-how-well-are-voters-represented-evidence-from-greece/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/european-populist-parties-in-government-how-well-are-voters-represented-evidence-from-greece/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In this paper we focus on the two populist parties, one radical left and one radical right, that have formed a coalition government after the January 2015 elections in Greece: SYRIZA and Independent Greeks (ANEL). Using data from the Greek Candidate Study 2015 and the Greek Voter Study 2015 we study the congruence between party &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/european-populist-parties-in-government-how-well-are-voters-represented-evidence-from-greece/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this paper we focus on the two populist parties, one radical left and one radical right, that have formed a coalition government after the January 2015 elections in Greece: SYRIZA and Independent Greeks (ANEL). Using data from the Greek Candidate Study 2015 and the Greek Voter Study 2015 we study the congruence between party voters and party elites for these two parties, also comparing them with mainstream, non‐populist parties. Employing a slightly modified &#8216;many to many’ approach, we measure congruence on a variety of issues (economic policy, austerity, Euroscepticism, immigration, law and order) and ideological divides (left/right, populism/anti‐populism) in order to assess the factors explaining the paradoxical resilience of Greek populism in power. The evidence generated can help us account for the trajectory of political antagonism in the Greek context throughout 2015 and in drawing some broader conclusions and challenges for future populism research.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Populism, anti-populism, and crisis</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/populism-anti-populism-and-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/populism-anti-populism-and-crisis/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This article focuses on two issues involved in the formation and political trajectory of populist representations within political antagonism. First, it explores the role of crisis in the articulation of populist discourse. This problematic is far from new within theories of populism but has recently taken a new turn. We thus purport to reconsider the &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/populism-anti-populism-and-crisis/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article focuses on two issues involved in the formation and political trajectory of populist representations within political antagonism. First, it explores the role of crisis in the articulation of populist discourse. This problematic is far from new within theories of populism but has recently taken a new turn. We thus purport to reconsider the way populism and crisis are related, mapping the different modalities this relation can take and advancing further their theorization from the point of view of a discursive theory of the political, drawing primarily on the Essex School perspective initially developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Second, this will involve focusing on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted equal attention. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual constitution, we will test the ensuing theoretical framework in an analysis of SYRIZA, a recent and, as a result, under-researched example of egalitarian, inclusionary populism emerging within the European crisis landscape.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Paradoxes of polarization: Democracy’s inherent division and the (anti-) populist challenge</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/paradoxes-of-polarization-democracys-inherent-division-and-the-anti-populist-challenge/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/paradoxes-of-polarization-democracys-inherent-division-and-the-anti-populist-challenge/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This article carries out a theoretical analysis of the relationship between democracy and polarization. It utilizes examples from a variety of premodern and modern societies to argue that difference and division are inherent to a vibrant democratic life and to representation itself. At the same time, a stable and pluralist democratic culture presupposes the establishment &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/paradoxes-of-polarization-democracys-inherent-division-and-the-anti-populist-challenge/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article carries out a theoretical analysis of the relationship between democracy and polarization. It utilizes examples from a variety of premodern and modern societies to argue that difference and division are inherent to a vibrant democratic life and to representation itself. At the same time, a stable and pluralist democratic culture presupposes the establishment of a common ground required for reflexive democratic decision making. To take into account both requirements, this must be a special type of common ground: an agonistic common ground. Agonism, as opposed to both the politics of raw antagonism and the postpolitics of consensus, values the existence of real alternatives and even ideological distance but aims at sublimating their pernicious effects. However, an agonistic outcome is always the result of a delicate balancing act between oligarchic and populist tendencies. In modernity, it predominantly took the form of a paradoxical blend of the democratic and the liberal tradition. The current crisis of liberal democracy and its postdemocratic mutation obliges one to ask whether democratic crisis may cause polarization, rather than the other way around, and puts in doubt the ability of the “moderate center” to deal with it in ways consolidating democracy. The article illustrates its theoretical rationale with examples from populism/antipopulism polarization in contemporary Greece, where elite-driven antipopulist discourse has consistently employed dehumanizing repertoires enhancing pernicious polarization.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The populism/anti-populism frontier and its mediation in crisis-ridden Greece: from discursive divide to emerging cleavage?</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/the-populism-anti-populism-frontier-and-its-mediation-in-crisis-ridden-greece-from-discursive-divide-to-emerging-cleavage/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/the-populism-anti-populism-frontier-and-its-mediation-in-crisis-ridden-greece-from-discursive-divide-to-emerging-cleavage/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep economic and social dislocation, leading to a crisis of representation and triggering populist mobilisations and anti-populist reactions. This article focuses on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted much attention in the relevant literature. Highlighting the need to &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/the-populism-anti-populism-frontier-and-its-mediation-in-crisis-ridden-greece-from-discursive-divide-to-emerging-cleavage/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep economic and social dislocation, leading to a crisis of representation and triggering populist mobilisations and anti-populist reactions. This article focuses on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted much attention in the relevant literature. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual constitution from a discursive perspective, it articulates a brief yet comprehensive genealogy of populist and anti-populist actors (parties and media) in Greece, exploring their discursive strategies. Moving on, it identifies the main characteristics this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden sociopolitical field, highlighting the implications for a contemporary understanding of cleavages, with potentially broader implications</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Discursive uses of &#8216;abnormality&#8217; in the Greek crisis</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/discursive-uses-of-abnormality-in-the-greek-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://toarcheio.org/items/discursive-uses-of-abnormality-in-the-greek-crisis/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In crisis-ridden Greece, a strict austerity program has been applied, from 2010 onwards—when the global and mainly European economic crisis hit the shores of the Aegean—under the supervision of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (the so-called troika). In order to provide an adequate framing and legitimization to this &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/discursive-uses-of-abnormality-in-the-greek-crisis/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In crisis-ridden Greece, a strict austerity program has been applied, from 2010 onwards—when the global and mainly European economic crisis hit the shores of the Aegean—under the supervision of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (the so-called troika). In order to provide an adequate framing and legitimization to this program, the crisis was discursively constructed not only as an economic one but also as a moral and a cultural crisis. Within this framework, the implementation of the austerity program became increasingly associated with discourses about ‘normality.’</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
