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		<title>Blame and punishment? The electoral politics of extreme austerity in Greece</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/blame-and-punishment-the-electoral-politics-of-extreme-austerity-in-greece/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/blame-and-punishment-the-electoral-politics-of-extreme-austerity-in-greece/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Can governments that introduce extreme austerity measures survive elections? Contrary to economic voting expectations, the PASOK government in Greece initially appeared to cope quite well, claiming victory in regional elections in 2010 despite widespread anti-austerity protests. In this article, we interpret this result with the help of a post-election survey, which also covered future voting &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/blame-and-punishment-the-electoral-politics-of-extreme-austerity-in-greece/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can governments that introduce extreme austerity measures survive elections? Contrary to economic voting expectations, the PASOK government in Greece initially appeared to cope quite well, claiming victory in regional elections in 2010 despite widespread anti-austerity protests. In this article, we interpret this result with the help of a post-election survey, which also covered future voting intentions. The explanatory power of models based on theories of economic voting and blame attribution as well as the electoral impact of the government&#8217;s representation of the crisis as an existential threat are assessed. Our analysis challenges the interpretation of the 2010 election as an indication of support for PASOK&#8217;s austerity policies and reveals weaknesses in its support base, which help contextualise its downfall in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The article also underlines the importance of studying the impact of crisis discourses on voting choice, particularly since blame attribution receives little support in this case.</p>
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		<title>Who protests in Greece? Mass opposition to austerity</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/who-protests-in-greece-mass-opposition-to-austerity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/who-protests-in-greece-mass-opposition-to-austerity/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The widespread opposition to unprecedented austerity measures in Greece provides a unique opportunity to study the causes of mass protest. This article reports the results of a survey of the adult population in which two-thirds of the respondents supported protest and 29 per cent reported actual involvement in strikes and/or demonstrations during 2010. Relative deprivation &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/who-protests-in-greece-mass-opposition-to-austerity/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The widespread opposition to unprecedented austerity measures in Greece provides a unique opportunity to study the causes of mass protest. This article reports the results of a survey of the adult population in which two-thirds of the respondents supported protest and 29 per cent reported actual involvement in strikes and/or demonstrations during 2010. Relative deprivation is a significant predictor of potential protest, but does not play any role in terms of who takes part in strikes or demonstrations. Previous protest participation emerges as a key predictor of actual protest. This study seeks to place these results within a comparative context, contrasting Greece with other countries facing similar challenges, and discusses the implications for the future of austerity politics.</p>
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		<title>Representation and Austerity Politics: Attitudes of Greek Voters and Elites Compared</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/representation-and-austerity-politics-attitudes-of-greek-voters-and-elites-compared/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/representation-and-austerity-politics-attitudes-of-greek-voters-and-elites-compared/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Drawing on surveys of voters and MPs in Greece, this article analyses elite–mass interaction on key policy (austerity, European integration, immigration) and ideological issues after the 2012 elections. We find that while for the government parties, New Democracy and PASOK, the level of congruence is quite high, MPs from opposition parties (SYRIZA, Golden Dawn) place &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/representation-and-austerity-politics-attitudes-of-greek-voters-and-elites-compared/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Drawing on surveys of voters and MPs in Greece, this article analyses elite–mass interaction on key policy (austerity, European integration, immigration) and ideological issues after the 2012 elections. We find that while for the government parties, New Democracy and PASOK, the level of congruence is quite high, MPs from opposition parties (SYRIZA, Golden Dawn) place themselves in more exposed positions in comparison with their voters. The observed substantial variation in the intensity and direction of congruence, across parties and issue preferences in Greece, reinforces the view that the dimensionality of political contestation is not reducible to a single ideological dimension.</p>
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		<title>Beyond the Usual Suspects? New Participants in Anti-Austerity Protests in Greece</title>
		<link>https://toarcheio.org/items/beyond-the-usual-suspects-new-participants-in-anti-austerity-protests-in-greece/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[apostolos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">http://arc.local/items/beyond-the-usual-suspects-new-participants-in-anti-austerity-protests-in-greece/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In light of the emergence of mass protest against the austerity measures taken by the Greek government in 2010, we investigate whether these protests mobilized just the &#8220;usual suspects&#8221; of left-wing trade union activists, or if a new protest generation emerged. Using a general population survey carried out in December 2010, we find that almost &#8230; <a href="https://toarcheio.org/items/beyond-the-usual-suspects-new-participants-in-anti-austerity-protests-in-greece/">Continued</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In light of the emergence of mass protest against the austerity measures taken by the Greek government in 2010, we investigate whether these protests mobilized just the &#8220;usual suspects&#8221; of left-wing trade union activists, or if a new protest generation emerged. Using a general population survey carried out in December 2010, we find that almost one-third of the adult Greek population had taken part in anti-austerity protests, but less than one in five had been first-time protesters. Comparing new protesters with veteran protesters and nonprotesters, we find that new protest recruits do not fit the expected pattern in many respects. In particular, new demonstrators are less left wing than veterans and do not differ significantly from non-demonstrators, thus fitting the model of &#8220;apprentice&#8221; protesters. For the recruitment of new strikers, on the other hand, factors such as trade union membership and support for left-wing parties are more important.</p>
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