https://toarcheio.org To Archeio project site Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:52 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.1 https://toarcheio.org/items/feeling-the-pulse-of-the-greek-debt-crisis-affect-on-the-web-of-blame/ Mon, 04 May 2020 23:24:52 +0000 https://toarcheio.org/items/feeling-the-pulse-of-the-greek-debt-crisis-affect-on-the-web-of-blame/ Continued]]> This article examines the affective content of Greek media representations of the debt crisis, from 2009 to 2012. We analyze the content of opinion pieces from journalists, experts and public intellectuals published in Greek newspapers, and identify their affective tone towards political actors and institutions. We focus on anger, fear and hope, and identify blame attribution frames, which underpin the public’s trust and confidence in domestic and European Union institutions. This article contributes to the systematic understanding of the impact of the debt crisis as a traumatic event on public opinion, and considers its implications for attitudes towards European integration.

]]> https://toarcheio.org/items/policies-that-succeed-and-programs-that-fail-ambiguity-conflict-and-crisis-in-greek-higher-education/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:46 +0000 http://arc.local/items/policies-that-succeed-and-programs-that-fail-ambiguity-conflict-and-crisis-in-greek-higher-education/ Continued]]> Why do some policies adopted by a wide margin fail to be implemented? Highlighting the role of policy entrepreneurial strategies within the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), we examine the implementation of Greek higher education reform in 2011 to argue that when policies adversely affect the status quo, successful entrepreneurial strategies of issue‐linkage and framing, side payments, and institutional rule manipulation are more likely to lead to implementation failure under conditions of crisis, centralized monopoly, and inconsistent political communication. The findings clarify MSA by specifying the conditions that increase the coupling strategies’ chances of success or failure and illuminate the role ambiguity and conflict play in policy reform and implementation.

]]> https://toarcheio.org/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:25 +0000 http://arc.local/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/ Continued]]> Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government’s implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms between 2010 and 2012 in two areas: tax and duty collection and liberalization of taxi licenses. Lower levels of trust decrease administrative capacity and widen problem intractability, creating a vicious cycle of noncooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications for administrative reforms and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice.

]]> https://toarcheio.org/items/policy-implementation-and-political-trust-greece-in-the-age-of-austerity/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:12 +0000 http://arc.local/items/policy-implementation-and-political-trust-greece-in-the-age-of-austerity/ Continued]]> Why did the Greek Socialist government consistently fail to faithfully implement the bailout reforms between 2010 and 2011 despite strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framwork by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue political trust underpins the government’s implementation track record. We use a simple game of insecure contracts to find lower levels of trust can exacerbate macroeconomic conditions creating a vicious cycle of non-cooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications on administrative efforts to tackle the sovereign debt problem and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice. Implementation failure and responsibility drift may be explained by the (in)ability to generate long-term political trust in repeated iterations among implementation partners.

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