https://toarcheio.org To Archeio project site Thu, 30 Apr 2020 14:16:36 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.1 https://toarcheio.org/items/clientelism-and-economic-policy-hybrid-characteristics-of-collective-action-in-greece/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:44 +0000 http://arc.local/items/clientelism-and-economic-policy-hybrid-characteristics-of-collective-action-in-greece/ Continued]]> How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron–client relations and the context of collective action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation in policy-making processes.

]]> https://toarcheio.org/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/ Tue, 16 Apr 2019 22:25:25 +0000 http://arc.local/items/quid-pro-quo-political-trust-and-policy-implementation-in-greece-during-the-age-of-austerity/ Continued]]> Why do national governments fail to implement deep reforms in light of strong international and European pressures? Building on the top-down implementation framework by Mazmanian and Sabatier, we argue that political trust underpins the government’s implementation track record. We investigate this argument by looking at the failure of the Greek government to implement bailout reforms between 2010 and 2012 in two areas: tax and duty collection and liberalization of taxi licenses. Lower levels of trust decrease administrative capacity and widen problem intractability, creating a vicious cycle of noncooperation and economic recession. Our findings have policy implications for administrative reforms and offer amendments to theories of implementation and institutional rational choice.

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